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Notes and Comments
TRANSSEXUALS IN LIMBO: THE SEARCH FOR A
LEGAL DEFINITION OF SEX
Transsexualism can be broadly defined as an obsession to belong
to the opposite sex which is not practically reversible by psychological
or other medical treatment. The phenomenon is not confined to Western
society of the twentieth century. "Numerous descriptions from classical
mythology, classical history, Renaissance, and nineteenth century his-
tory, plus many sources of cultural anthropology, point to the
long-standing and widespread pervasiveness of the transsexual phe-
nomenon." 1 Historically, the transsexual was unable to effect a physical
conversion, except for castration in the case of a male.2  Medical
advances have, however, made a surgical sex change feasible.' and
the surgical procedures have been made available at gender identity
clinics such as the one at the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions.4
A sex reassignment operation may solve the transsexual's medical
problem, but it is potentially the source of legal problems, because
the law has not faced the question of defining an individual's sex.
The paucity of legal precedents for transsexuals leaves a void that is
likely to be filled with inappropriate medical or moral judgments
until laws are changed or interpreted so as to recognize this human
phenomenon.
MEDICAL DEVELOPMENT
A person's sex is normally determined at conception when either
an X chromosome or a Y chromosome in the fertilizing sperm couples
with the X chromosome present in the ovum. A female is conceived
when two X chromosomes meet and a male when the combination
is XY.' Notwithstanding these genetic differences, both sexes are
1. Green, Mythological, Historical and Cross-Cultural Aspects of Transsexualism,
in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 22 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
2. Money, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 249 (1970-1971) [herein-
after cited as Sex Reassignment].
3. Id.
4. Money & Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism:
A Case Study in Medical Sociology, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT
267 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969). This comment presumes the legality of sex
reassignment surgery. However, it should be noted that this issue has not been
resolved by the legal profession. A recent comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassign-
ment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. Rv. 963 (1971), concludes that if the
patient selection and evaluation procedures conform to medical standards such an
operation should be permitted.
5. J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 15-21 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
SEX ERRORS].
It is possible for an error, occurring either before fertilization or in the
earliest phases of cell division, to result in the wrong combination of sex chromosomes
being carried by the fertilized egg. Such errors may produce mental retardation,
sociopathic behavior, or impaired sexual development, including possible steriliy.
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identical in early embryonic development. Each embryo possesses
the capability to develop all parts of both the male and female
reproductive systems.6
Biological Defects
It is relatively simple in such a biological process for anatomical
defects to occur. For example, in the male embryo, any defect in the
developmental sequence may result in the child being born with external
female genitalia. When this happens, the child who is chromosomally
a male exhibits an external appearance which is not different from
that of a normal female.' A similar defect results in cases in which
the internal female development is not suppressed. thereby causing the
otherwise normal male to be born with a uterus and fallopian tubes.'
Other abnormalities may be created by the incomplete development
of the external sex organs. Because of this, doctors are sometimes
confronted with an ambiguity of appearance which makes it extremely
difficult to determine the newborn child's sex accurately."
Defects such as these not only create inconsistencies in the classi-
fication of the individual's sex, but also may lead to psychological
problems. Generally the psychological sexual identity develops through-
out childhood and normally corresponds to the physiological sex."'
In the majority of humans each successive step in this developmental
6. C. MaOWE, E.IBRYONIC SEX HORMONES AND SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION 4(1947) [he:eihafter cited as MOORE].
7. Sirx EtioPs, stipra note 5, at 31-32.
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id. at 41.
There is a genital tubercle which could be either a large clitoris or a small
penis. This organ has an open gutter underneath it instead of a covered urethral
tube. The urinary orifice is at its root or base, more or less in the female position.
The opening at the base may be small and lead directly to the bladder; or it
may be a quite large urogenital sinus from the interior of which can be traced
both the urethral and vaginal passages. The latter may either connect with the
cervix of the uterus or end blindly. Outside and below the opening, it will be
ambiguous whether there is a scrotum with incomplete fushion or labia majora
more fused than they should have been.Id.
10. Money lists seven variables which interact to produce the ultimate sex of the
individual:
1. Chromosomal - fertilization and early zygotic proliferation as either a
46/XX female or a 46/XY male, that is a sex chromatin-positive or
-negative respectively.
2. Gonadal - differentiation of the primitive gonadal ridge into either an
ovary or a testis.
3. Hormonal - differentiation of hormonal function (a) in the fetus to pro-
duce feminine or masculine organizer substances, and (b) at puberty to
produce either feminine or masculine secondary sexual characteristics.
4. Internal morphological - differentiation of either the mfillerian or the
mesonephric (wolffian) duct into the internal accessory organs of re-
production.
5. External morphological - differentiation of the external genital anlagen
into either female or male sex organs.
6. Assignmental - assignment of sex at birth as either female or male, with
subsequent experiences of rearing reinforcing this decision.
7. Psychosexual - differentiation after birth of a psychosexual identity as
either female or male.
Money, The Sex Chromatin and Psycholosexual Differentiation, in THE SEX CHRO-
MATIN 434-35 (K. Moore ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as SEX CHROMATIN].
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process is consistent with the preceding ones and the psychological
gender identity agrees with the sex assigned at birth." However,
where a discrepancy has occurred in any of the developmental steps,
a disparity may exist between the chromosomal and psychological sex
identity. 12 The transsexual, on the other hand, has appropriately paired
chromosomes and genitalia and does not exhibit any discrepancy in
any of the physiological developmental stages. This fact leads to the
conclusion that the transsexual's identity disparity is the end product
solely of an abnormal psychological differentiation.'
Transsexualism: A Psychological Problem
The cause of transsexualism is presently unknown. Some theorists
believe the cause is organic while others feel the problem is psycho-
genic.' Those who support the organic theories speculate that the
genetic code system, about which little is known, may force the child
to become psychologically what he is not biologically; or that a yet
undiscovered hormone may act on the fetus to increase the chances
of subsequent transsexual development without affecting sexual anat-
omy.' 5 The psychologists, while recognizing the possible validity of
the organic theories, point out the likelihood that development of the
normal gender identity has been inhibited by trauma or psychological
pressure. Under either theory the conclusion is that transsexual
behavior is initiated at a critical period in the process of gender
differentiation, and that once this process begins it is irreversible.' 6
The preoperative male transsexual closely resembles both the
transvestite and the effeminate homosexual. The male transsexual
thinks of himself as a woman with male genitals, and because he is
psychologically uncomfortable when dressed in male clothing he usually
wears female attire. The transsexual, however, unlike the transvestite,
receives no sexual excitement from cross-dressing, and unlike the
homosexual, he conceives his attraction toward men as being hetero-
sexual in nature. Both the homosexual and the transvestite, unlike
the transsexual, consider themselves to be males and both are able to
derive pleasure from the use of their genitals. 17  The female trans-
11. SEX ERRORS, supra note 5, at 85.
12. SEX CHROMATIN, supra note 10, at 435.
13. It is this discrepancy which justifies, in the minds of many people, a sexual
reassignment in the case of hermaphroditism, dual sexuality, but not in the case of
transsexualism. Money, Sex Reassignment as Related to Hermaphroditism, in TRANS-
SEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 111 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
14. Sex Reassignment, supra note 2, at 251.
15. Money, Sex Reassignment as Related to Hermaphroditism and Transsex-
ualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 112 (R. Green & J. Money
ed. 1969). It has already been established that fetal sex hormones and hormones in-jected into the pregnant mother do have some influence on the development of the
brain. The question has been raised as to the possible effects of barbiturates and other
medications taken during pregnancy on the subsequent psychosexual differentiation of
the child. See also Sex Reassignment, supra note 2, at 253.
16. Sex Reassignment, supra note 2, at 253.
17. Green, Psychiatric Management of Special Problems in Transsexualism, in
TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 282-83 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
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sexual exhibits behavioral patterns which parallel those of the male
transsexual; that is, she feels that she is a male and emotionally and
psychologically acts accordingly."'
The transsexual syndrome produces individuals who exhibit a
fanatical desire to impersonate the opposite sex as well as to be rid
of their natural sexual appurtenances. Not only do they wish their
bodies to resemble the other sex but they also wish to live the life of
the other sex, both occupationally and erotically. The transsexual is
usually not responsive to any form of psychotherapy and requires
surgery for social adjustment.' 9 After surgery, the majority of patients
exhibit improvement both in their adjustment to society and in their
own feelings of well-being and satisfaction.2" They are able to have
satisfactory sexual relations as members of their new sex although the
penis in the female-to-male transsexual is unable to become erect
and requires some form of support for intercourse.2'
LEGAL PROBLEMS
Although it is almost impossible to estimate the prevalence of
transsexualism, the fact that the Johns Hopkins Gender Identity
Clinic received approximately 1,500 inquiries in the five-year period
following its inception indicates that the number of transsexuals is
by no means small. 22 The existence of this transsexual population
coupled with the availability of the "sex change" operation has begun
to create various legal problems including the proper sex designation
on official records, the right to marry, testamentary identity and
criminal liability.
Sexual Identity
Of course, the law and the courts must use medical opinion and
knowledge when deciding to which sex a person belongs. But the
courts must also interpret and use expert opinions to serve the purposes
of the law. Two courts have rendered decisions which imply that
because the male-to-female transsexual is chromosomally a male he
should be treated legally as a male.28 The effect of these decisions
is to treat the chromosome factor as the single criterion to be used
in determining legal sex. The absurdity of this conclusion becomes
apparent when one considers the complex method of sex differentiation,
most of which occurs after the chromosomal coupling. 4 The paradox
18. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Female Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM
AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 59-87 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
19. SEX ERRORS, supra note 5, at 86-87.
20. Randell, Preoperative and Postoperative Status of Male and Female Trans-
sexuals, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 379 (R. Green & J. Money
ed. 1969).
21. SEX ERRORS, supra note 5, at 87-88.
22. Sex Reassignment, supra note 2, at 257.
23. See Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966) ; Corbett
v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970).
24. See note 10 supra.
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created by the "chromosome test" is illustrated by a comparison of
the androgen insensitive male with the male-to-female transsexual.
The androgen insensitive is chromosomally a male, but because his
body is unable to utilize the male hormone, androgen, he develops
anatomically as a female. Because of the individual's external appear-
ance he will be announced and registered as a female and throughout
his life society will treat him as a female.25 The male-to-female trans-
sexual, as previously mentioned, is a male who, by surgical recon-
struction, has acquired an external female appearance. Both the
androgen insensitive and the transsexual appear to be females to the
average examiner ;26 both believe themselves to be female ;27 both are
able to have sexual relations with a male partner ;2 both require surgical
treatment to engage in sexual intercourse;29 and neither is able to
bear children.8" Since both the androgen insensitive and the trans-
sexuals are feminine in their acts and in their appearance, it is logical
that society will treat them similarly. Therefore, there is no reason
for the law to treat them differently merely because medical criteria
distinguish between the two.
The law, while respecting medical opinion in many areas, has
never been governed by strict medical definitions when faced with
countervailing social interests."' For example, the adoption statutes
in a majority of jurisdictions specify that an adopted child shall be
deemed to be the natural child of his adoptive parents,'2 yet for
purposes of diagnosing heriditary diseases the child is obviously the
offspring of his biological parents. Furthermore, the definition of
insanity for legal purposes differs markedly from the one employed
25. Money, Matched Pairs of Hermaphrodites: Behavioral Biology of Sexual
Differentiation from Chromosomes to Gender Identity, 33 ENG'R & SCIENCE 34, 35
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Matched Pairs].
26. Compare SEx ERRORS, supra note 5, at 32 with In re Anonymous, 57 Misc.
2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
27. Compare Matched Pairs, supra note 25, at 38 with Pauly, Adult Manifesta-
tions of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 58 (R.
Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
28. Compare Matched Pairs, supra note 25, at 38 with Pauly, Adult Manifesta-
tions of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 37 (R.
Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
29. Compare SEX ERRORS, supra note 5, at 32 with Pauly, Adult Manifestations
of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 37 (R. Green
& J. Money ed. 1969). Although, externally, the androgen insensitive exhibits female
anatomy, the vagina is usually very short and requires surgical lengethening to permit
sexual intercourse. SEX ERRORS, supra at 32.
30. Compare SEX ERRORS, supra note 5, at 32 with Green, Psychiatric Manage-
ment of Special Problems in Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGN-
MENT 284 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
31. See, e.g., Stitely v. Fleming, 178 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1959) (physical
impairments of obesity and diabetes were held not to fall within the statutory definition
of disability). See also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (1964) which provides inter alia: "the
term 'disability' means (A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment" (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 78(a) (1966). Courts have construed
similar statutes as implying that for inheritance purposes a child who has been adopted
is to be treated as having never been born to her natural mother, therefore, as in-
eligible for the preferential tax rates reservd for lineal descendants of the deceased.
In re Estate of Jalo, 474 P.2d 355 (Ore. 1970).
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by psychiatrists for medical purposes, s and the legal and medical
definitions of life may differ with respect to an unborn child.34
The conclusion which should be drawn from these factors seems
clear. Because the law is primarily concerned with human relation-
ships, only those biological factors which influence person-to-person
interactions should be criteria used in determining a person's legal
sex. Medically it can be argued that in making any sexual determina-
tion the chromosomal composition and the internal anatomical structure
should be taken into consideration, as well as the psychology and
outward appearance of the individual. However, since only the latter
two factors have any direct effect upon society, it is those factors, not
microscopic cell studies, which should determine a person's legal sex.
Change Of Official Records
Because transsexualism falls within the category of behavioral
patterns which society considers deviant, 5 the postoperative trans-
sexual must create a new identity with as little reference to the past
as possible. Many of these persons begin by attempting to effectuate
a change of the sex designation listed on their birth certificates.8 6
Several states have recently modified their statutes to permit such
changes" and ten states, including Maryland, allow a change to be
effected within the existing statutory provisions by administrative
action. 8 One New York court, however, when confronted with this
issue refused to permit such a change.
In the case of Anonymous v. Weiner,39 a transsexual had re-
quested that the Director of the New York City Board of Health
change the sex designation on his birth certificate to female following
a successful sexual reassignment. The Board of Health referred the
problem to the New York Academy of Medicine which issued a report
advising against the change of records. The Board followed the
Academy's recommendation and refused to allow any alteration of the
birth records. The transsexual then sought judicial relief. The court
upheld the Board's decision stating that it had no authority to substitute
33. See, e.g., Longoria v. State, 53 Del. 311, 168 A.2d 695 (1961). The disparity
between the medical and legal tests of insanity has led one observer to comment that
"unfortunately, the test was formulated by lawyers without consulting medical opinion
and does not take into consideration the new discoveries of psychiatry, including the
role of the unconscious, the power of the emotions, the influence of delusions, or the
reactions to hallucination." C. FRANKEL, 3 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 17.15
(rev. ed. 1970).
34. See Note, The Killing of a Viable Fetus is Murder, 30 MD. L. REv. 137(1970).
35. Knorr, Wolf & Meyer, Psychiatric Evaluation of Male Transsexuals for
Surgery, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 272 (R. Green & J. Money
ed. 1969).
36. Sherwin, Legal Aspects of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND
SEX REASSIGNMENT 423 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
37. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-326A4 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111Y2,
§ 73-17(1) (d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). See also LA. REv. STAT. § 40:336 (Supp.
1971) (court decree required).
38. See Report by the Committee on Public Health, The New York Academy of
Medicine, Change of Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals, 42 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MFD. 721, 723 (1966).
39. 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966).
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its views for those of the Board responsible for administering the
statute, unless the director had been arbitrary or capricious in his
actions. The court did not expressly hold that the sex designation
on a birth certificate may not be altered; however, it did commend
the Academy and the Board of Health, thereby implying approval of
the decision.40
The Academy, in its report to the Board, indicated that any
change in the birth certificate would destroy its evidentiary value,
although the certificate could still be used for such purposes as preparing
selective service registrations and passports.4 It further concluded
that the desire of the transsexual to conceal his status was outweighed
by society's interest in protecting the public from fraud. Although
these arguments do have some validity, they are outweighed by
countervailing considerations.
Although the act of assuming an identity which is both physically
and psychologically that of the opposite sex may appear to some to
be deceptive or fraudulent, this conduct does not meet the legal test
of fraud unless it was done with the intent to deceive another for the
purpose of securing an unjust advantage.4" Furthermore, under these
circumstances, the person alleging the fraud would have to prove not
only that the transsexual's original sex was material to the trans-
action but also that he relied upon the changed birth certificate to
his detriment.43  Concededly, the transsexual wants to deceive people
with respect to his former sex, but this deception is not calculated to
produce any unjust advantage nor is his former sex material to the
majority of everyday social interactions.
40. The court stated:
When confronted with this need for a formulation of policy and possible imple-
mentation by regulation, the Board of Health, in recognition of the serious con-
sequences attendant upon a decision in the affirmative or in the negative,
initiated an exhaustive inquiry into the subject and called upon the New York
Academy of Medicine to study the problem and to submit its recommendations
to the Board. This recognition of the need for full exploration of the problem
posed reflects the Board's awareness of its obligation to society to ensure the
accuracy of public records. It also indicates its deep concern for the individual,
the transsexual, who has been described by Dr. Harry Benjamin as "among the
most miserable people I have ever met." [Citation omitted]. Most significant, it
represents adherence to the highest standards of the administrative process.
The New York Academy of Medicine is also to be commended for assuming
this delegated responsibility and for the manner in which it fulfilled its undertaking.
270 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
41. 32 C.F.R. § 1613.11 (1971) states that the selective service registrar shall
obtain from the registrant all information necessary to complete the registration.
22 C.F.R. § 5 1.43(a) (1) (1971) provides that a birth certificate is primary evidence
of citizenship or nationality, proof of which is necessary to secure a passport.
42. Sherwood and Roberts-Kennewick, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
322 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1963).
43. Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 204 A.2d
326 (1964).
The elements of legal fraud are: (1) that a representation made by a party was
false; (2) that either its falsity was known to that party or the misrepresentation
was made with such reckless indifference to truth to impute knowledge to him;
(3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding some other
person; (4) that that person not only relied upon the misrepresentation but had
the right to rely upon it with full belief of its truth, and that he would not have
done the thing from which damage resulted if it had not been made; and (5) that
that person suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation.
236 Md. at 460, 204 A.2d at 329.
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Moreover, in those cases in which the individual's sex is material
deception is more likely if society relies on the original sex designation
than if it uses an amended description coinciding with the transsexual's
surgically acquired sex. In cases where it is important to determine
whether the person has been the subject of a sex reassignment operation
a physical examination is apt to be required with no reliance being
placed upon the sex designation recorded at birth."
Birth certificates are not, or need not be, treated as such perfect
proof of a particular fact that countervailing values in having them
changed can be ignored. In the law of evidence, a birth certificate is
merely prima facie evidence45 and is therefore rebuttable by other
proof.46 A majority of states allow new birth certificates to be issued
upon proof of adoption or legitimation,47 and some states permit
issuance of a new certificate to reflect a legal change of name4" or a
successful operative sex change, 49 without questioning the probative
value of the certificate as evidence.5° It appears that the reasoning
behind these rules permitting record changes is that if information
contained therein is of no interest to the public and if preservation of
that data might harm the individual, the records may be changed to
enable the person to acquire respectability in the community.5 For
example, if the parents of an illegitimate child eventually marry, the
child's birth certificate will be changed so that he will be able to
acquire the status of a child born in lawful wedlock.52 A logical
extension of such reasoning would mandate similar treatment for the
transsexual's records, since disclosure of transsexualism may well
subject him to more harassment and ridicule than would a revelation
of illegitimacy. 53
44. See, e.g., Army Reg. 40-501, C24, ch. 2, § IX, 1 2-14s (10 Nov. 1969), which
provides that people who have had operative sex changes are unfit for military service.
Likewise, a competitor in the Olympic Games must agree to submit to a medical
examination, the purpose of which is to determine the athlete's sex. N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1967, at 69, col. 4.
45. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 26 (1971).
46. Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47 (1937).
47. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 19(b) (1971) ; OHIo REv. CODE ANN.§§ 3705.15, 3705.18 (Page 1971). See also AM. JUR. 2d Desk Book, Doc. No. 129(Tabulation of States adopting the Uniform Vital Statistics Act).
48. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2422(a) (1964).
49. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 19(b) (1971) permits a new certificate to be issued
in cases of adoption, legitimation or adjudication of paternity yet the statute contains
no provision decreasing the evidentiary value of the changed document. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 26 (1971).
51. Sklaroff v. Stevens, 84 R.I. 1, 120 A.2d 694 (1956).
52. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 19(b) (1) (i) (1971).
53. Washington Post, May 14, 1971, § C, at 1, col. 1.
This article chronicles the treatment allegedly received by a transsexual
arrested by Baltimore police. According to the victim, her car battery had gone dead
and she and her friend were seeking aid when the police arrested her. After showing
the officers her identification the police continued to demand that she produce her
"real I.D." Id. at 9, col. 2. She further stated that she was undressed by a matron
at the police station and that both male and female officers inspected her. In describ-
ing her experience, the transsexual said: "'The men took me for a freak, something
to make fun of, a circus beast or a freak.'" Id. at col. 3.
Denying these allegations, a vice squad spokesman said that inspection is not
necessary. "'We can usually tell they're men by their build and all .... I've been in
this business for a long while and you ain't going to fool me."' Id. When asked for
1971]
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The Right To Marry
After successful operative sex conversions, many transsexuals
have married and lived apparently normal family lives. 54 Since proof
of sex is not usually required to secure a marriage license, 55 it is unlikely
that legal problems will arise unless the validity of the marriage is
challenged in annulment or probate proceedings.56 Although the latter
situation has yet to be reported, the former was considered in Great
Britain in the case of Corbett v. Corbett.57
In Corbett, a converted male-to-female transsexual was married
to a normal male who possessed full knowledge of his spouse's sexual
reassignment. Within a few weeks, a voluntary separation was agreed
upon because of incompatibility. The husband then sought annulment
alleging that his wife was not a woman. The court, after hearing
extensive medical testimony, concluded that a person's sex is fixed
at birth and is not changed by a subsequent surgical conversion. There-
fore, holding that the male-to-female transsexual is not a woman for
purposes of marriage, the court annulled the marriage.5" Because of
the holding in this case and its possible effect on the obligations arising
out of the marriage contract, 9 it is important to consider the validity
of transsexual marriages.
Although neither the common law nor modern statutes define the
term marriage,6" it is presumed to carry its ordinary meaning for all
legal purposes."' Traditionally, marriage has been understood to mean
the legal union of man and woman, 62 yet the terms male and female in
the context of this relationship have never been given explicit legal
comment, Baltimore State's Attorney Milton B. Allen said that "'[p]rejudice against
people with what we call sexual problems is probably greater than prejudice against
blacks.'" Id. at col. 4. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1971, at 30, col. 7, which
describes the plight of a fifty-two-year-old music teacher who was suspended from
his tenured position when he informed the local school board that he had undergone a
sex reassignment operation prior to the close of the previous school year.
54. Interview with Howard W. Jones, Jr., M.D., and John Money, Ph.D.,
members of the Gender Identity Clinic staff at the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions,
in Baltimore, Mar. 16, 1971. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1971, at 30, col. 7, which
chronicles some of the problems encountered by a sexually reassigned father of three
who intends to continue his marriage relationship. A discussion of the validity of a
marriage which pre-dates a surgical sex change, however, is beyond the scope of
this comment.
55. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, § 6 (Supp. 1970).
56. Cf., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971). But see Evening
Sun (Baltimore), July 24, 1971, at 1, col. 4, reporting a woman's suit against her
husband for allegedly undergoing a sex change operation without her consent.
57. 2 All E.R. 33 (1970).
58. The court stated that "the law should adopt . . . the chromosomal, gonadal
and genital tests [for determining the sex of the individual], and, if all three are
congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore
any operative intervention." Id. at 48.
59. Since the right of alimony is incident to the marriage and can not be predi-
cated upon or granted in consequence of annulment, future support arrangements
depend upon the validity of the marriage. Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605
(1936) ; Yake v. Yake, 170 Md. 75, 183 A. 555 (1936).
60. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, §§ 1-19 (1968 and Supp. 1970).
61. Maillard v. Lawrence, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 251, 261 (1853).
62. Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N.E. 841 (1896). See also State v.
Setzer, 226 N.C. 216, 37 S.E.2d 513 (1946).
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meaning.6" Therefore, the state, to prohibit a transsexual marriage,
would be required either to enact an express statutory prohibition or
to define the sex of the individual in such a way as to invalidate
the union.6
Although the state is justified in regulating marriage,65 this power
is limited to those aspects of marriage which might adversely affect
society as a whole.66 The state may not restrict a person's freedom
to marry unless that restriction is "directed at a social evil and employs
a reasonable means to prevent that evil."6 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court, in declaring Virginia's antimiscegenation statute unconstitu-
tional, implied that unless the state had an adequate basis for denying
two people the right to marry, any restrictions on their relationship
would be prohibited by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due
process of law.6" The effect of this decision, when coupled with the
63. The term "man" as used in rape statutes means a "male of the human species
of the age of 14 years and upwards." Kenyon v. People, 26 N.Y. 203, 211 (1863).
"The word 'male' is used to denote sex and to distinguish the person or animal so
described as belonging to the sex other than the female sex." People v. McElvain,
341 Ill. 224, 172 N.E. 131, 134 (1930).
64. The inability of either party, at the time of the marriage, to engage in sexual
intercourse is sufficient to render the marriage invalid. J.G. v. H.G., 33 Md. 401
(1870). However, the mere inability to procreate will not justify annulment. Thus
it has been held that a divorce could not be predicated upon the fact that prior to
marriage a woman underwent an operation in which her reproductive organs were
removed since she was still able to have normal sexual intercourse. Wilson v. Wilson,
126 Pa. Super. 423, 191 A. 666 (1937). The transsexual, however, should be advised
to inform his prospective spouse about his prior sexual status even though he is able
to maintain a normal sexual relationship since the courts may avoid any marriage
procured through fraud.
The existence of a valid marriage seems to require that the parties inform
each other of all factors which are material to their union. Generally, the non-
disclosure of incidental matters such as fame, fortune or temperament will not render
the marriage void. However, it has been held that the concealment of any con-
dition which will affect the health or well-being of the parties goes to the essence
of the relationship, thereby justifying judicial avoidance of the marriage. Brown
v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114 (1922). In spite of this language, the fact
that a party had not informed her spouse that she was infected with a venereal
disease was held not to be adequate grounds for a divorce. Koehler v. Koehler, 137
Ark. 302, 209 S.W. 283 (1919). Furthermore, concealment of a prior marriage was
not sufficient to annul a Roman Catholic marriage merely because the injured spouse
suffered great mental distress. Oswald v. Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 A. 81 (1924).
It therefore seems debatable whether concealment of a surgical sex change is a suffi-
cient ground to warrant a decree of nullity. However, the existence of this uncer-
tainty indicates that disclosure of this fact is the wiser course to follow.
65. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
66. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court, in upholding
Utah's law prohibiting polygamous marriages, stated that the government has a legiti-
mate interest in regulating marriage because "out of its fruits spring social relations
and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal." Id. at 165. The Court went on to say that because "polygamy leads to the
patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people
in stationary depotism," it may be forbidden by law. Id. at 166.
67. Perez v. Lippole, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (1948).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Speaking for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren, after describing marriage as an essential right, stated: "Marriage
is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.
[Citations omitted]. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Id. at 12.
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language contained in Meyer v. Nebraska,69 indicates that marriage is
a constitutionally protected right of our society.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,0 a landmark decision in 1969, the
Supreme Court invalidated state residency requirements for persons
receiving welfare on the ground that such requirements interfered with
the constitutionally protected right to travel. The Court held that
classifications which tend to penalize the exercise of a constitutional
right can be sustained under the equal protection clause only if "neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest."'" Thus, since
marriage is a right which enjoys constitutional protection, it would
seem that a state cannot prohibit a transsexual union except to promote
a compelling governmental interest.
The usual basis for denying the right to marry is the state's in-
terest in promoting the health, safety or morals of the general public.7"
It is this police power rationale which justifies the state in prohibiting
a marriage if the union would subject either party or their offspring
to the threat of contracting an infectious disease73 or where medical
evidence indicates that a child might inherit his parents' genetically
undesirable traits.74 Arguably, the state, as parens patriae, may be
able constitutionally to postpone the marriage of minor children until
they are better equipped to undertake such a relationship. 7  However,
unless the marriage itself will adversely affect society as a whole7 6
or unless the union will create a health hazard either to the spouses
themselves or to yet unborn children, the state may not within the
bounds of constitutionality prohibit the parties from entering into a
valid marriage relationship.
69. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The liberty contemplated by the fourteenth amendmentincludes the right of the individual "to marry, establish a home and bring up children."
Id. at 399.
70. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
71. Id. at 634.
72. Following Loving v. Virginia, state regulation of marriage appears to be
subject to the same limitations as any other legitimate exercise of its police power.The police power of the state includes everything which is needed to protect thepublic safety, health and morals. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). To justify
the state in imposing its authority it must appear that the interests of the public requirethe interference and that the means are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose
and are not unduly oppressive to individuals, State v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 95N.E. 924 (1911) ; and do not infringe upon the fundamental rights of a citizen. Blue
v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900).
73. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1969), which provides that a "person
affected with syphilis or gonorrhea that is communicable or that may become com-
municable" is prohibited from marrying.
74. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-12 (Supp. 1967), which requires that men-tally defective individuals be sterilized before a marriage license may be issued.
75. The power of the state to control children exceeds the power to control
adults even where there is an invasion of constitutionally protected rights. See Ginz-berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
76. The state may not invade any protected areas under the guise of preventing
activities which fall within the scope of legitimate government regulation. Therefore,
even assuming that the state could legally prevent the transsexual sex reassignment
by direct action, it would still be unable to discourage this operation by prohibiting
the transsexual from exercising any fundamental freedoms. Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
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Assuming the state can constitutionally prohibit homosexual mar-
riages, 77 the transsexual union could be invalidated by legally fixing
the person's sex at birth. 8 Under normal circumstances, the sex of
the infant is determined by the attending physician based upon a
superficial examination of the external genitals.79 Since a birth defect
may result in a mistaken identification it would be unwise for the
state to declare unalterably that a person's sex is that determined at
birth." Furthermore, since the sex of an individual is initially predi-
cated upon external appearance, there is no reason to prohibit modifica-
tion of that determination if the external appearance is subsequently
changed by surgical procedures.
Therefore, since a prohibition on transsexual marriages might
deprive the sexually reassigned individual of the ability to maintain
a legal heterosexual relationship,"- forcing the transsexual to choose
between celibacy and illegality; since the transsexual marriage will
have no different effect upon society from any other heterosexual
marriage; and since the transsexual carries no infectious disease as
a result of his surgical experience; the state has no legitimate reason
for depriving the transsexual of the right to marry the person of
his choice.
Estate Planning
Having undergone a successful sex reassignment operation, the
transsexual may be faced with problems involving the descent and
distribution of property. Although this problem has not yet been
presented to the courts, a situation can be envisioned in which property
is bequeathed to a person described only as "my son." If this "son"
is surgically converted to a female prior to the testator's death but
after the will is executed the executor may refuse to convey theproperty, alleging that the testator's son no longer exists. In this
situation, the transsexual may be forced to seek judicial relief.
77. On the same grounds used to justify transsexual marriages, it could be arguedthat a homosexual marriage should be permitted. However, the language in Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878), which prohibits polygamy because a poly-gamous relationship would disturb the social condition of the surrounding people, canbe more easily applied to a homosexual union than to a transsexual marriage. Thehomosexual relationship is quite apparent and sometimes disturbing in a heterosexual
environment, see Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New MarylandCriminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded,30 MD. L. Rxv. 91, 97 (1970) ; however, the physical resemblance of the transsexual
to others of his new sex would render his marriage inoffensive to the casual observer.See also Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) in which the court upheldMinnesota's ban on homosexual marriages stating that "in common sense and in a
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex." Id. at 187.
78. The state, however, may not use this method to circumvent the constitutionalprohibitions upon enacting an express statutory bar to these marriages. See note 76
supra.
79. Money, Potter and Stoll, Sex Reannouncement in Hereditary Sex Deformity:Psychology and Sociology of Habilitation, 3 Soc. ScI. & ME. 207, 207-09 (1969).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1966), which provides that sexualintercourse between unmarried persons constitutes a misdemeanor.
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The courts, in construing any will, try to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the testator as evidenced by the document itself when
read in light of the circumstances surrounding its execution . 2  In
other words, the court will attempt to effectuate the dispositive plan of
the testator insofar as it has been exposed in the language of the will."3
Thus, if the will itself, when considered in its entirety, and if ambig-
uous, with extrinsic evidence,84 clearly indicates that the testator
intended that the transsexual be the recipient of his property, there
is no reason why the use of the word "son" or "daughter" should
thwart that result.85 If it can be ascertained that a particular individual
is the intended beneficiary, the fact that the will's gender description
does not coincide with that individual's sexual identity should be of
no consequence." Taking another example, if a person having both
male and female issue bequeathed his property to "my sons," the court
82. In re Burleigh's Estate, 405 Pa. 373, 175 A.2d 838 (1961).
It is now hornbook law (1) that the testator's intent is the polestar and must
prevail; and (2) that his intent must be gathered from a consideration of (a) all
the language contained in the four corners of his will and (b) his scheme of dis-
tribution and (c) the circumstances surrounding him at the time he made his will
and (d) the existing facts; and (3) that technical rules or canons of construction
should be resorted to only if the language of the will is ambiguous or conflicting
or the testator's intent is for any reason uncertain [citations omitted].
Id. at 839-40. See 4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.6 (W. Bowe & D. Parker
rev. 1961).
83. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 462 (2d ed. 1956).
Accord, Whitmore v. Starks, 17 Ill. 2d 202, 161 N.E.2d 254 (1959); Darden v.
Bright, 173 Md. 563, 198 A. 431 (1938). See also 4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 32.2, at 237 (W. Bowe & D. Parker rev. 1961).
84. Whitmore v. Starks, 17 Ill. 2d 202, 161 N.E.2d 254 (1959) ; Darden v. Bright,
173 Md. 563, 198 A. 431 (1938). See also 4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 32.2, at
237 (W. Bowe & D. Parker rev. 1961).
85. See Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120, 103 S.W.2d 670 (1937). The
testator devised a life estate to his son with the remainder to vest in his son's children.
One of the son's children predeceased him leaving issue who, at their grandfather's
death, claimed their deceased parent's share. The court held that the testator had
meant to include all of his issue within the term child stating:
the words "child or children" are to be construed to mean and include grand-
children, when a reading of the will justified such conclusion, or when otherwise
the testator's will would be inoperative in part, or when the statutory law requires
such construction.
103 S.W.2d at 672-73. See also Dunn v. Cory, 56 N.J. Eq. 507, 39 A. 368 (1898).
In this case, the court was asked to direct the executors in administering a will which
bequeathed a sum of money "to the child of Sarah Roy." Sarah Roy's only child had
died prior to the will's execution leaving surviving issue, thus presenting the question
of whether, by the use of the word "child," the testator had meant "grandchild." After
stating the general rule that the word "child" does not normally mean "grandchild,"
the court went on to hold that if, as in this case, the will itself indicates that the
testator meant "grandchild" the word "child" will be construed accordingly.
86. Barnstable v. United States Nat'l Bank, 232 Ore. 36, 374 P.2d 386 (1962).
The court in this case was asked to interpret a provision in a will which stated:
"To my foster daughter, Joan I leave the sum of $1.00." The testator's adopted
daughter, Joan, contended that this provision did not refer to her and, therefore, under
the Oregon statute, her father had died intestate. The court rejected this argument
stating: "When the testator describes a relationship he knows did not exist . . .
but identifies the object of his bounty by name, he will be deemed to have made his
benefaction with a knowledge of the nonexistence of the relationship described."
Id. at 388. See also In re Morrison's Estate, 106 N.H. 388, 211 A.2d 904 (1965),
which stated that an erroneous description of a beneficiary is not fatal if his identity
is reasonably clear. See generally 4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 34.38 (W. Bowe
& D. Parker rev. 1961).
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confronted with a transsexual heir would probably admit extrinsic
evidence to explain what the testator meant by the language of the
will. In this situation, the court would view the circumstances sur-
rounding the will's execution to determine whether the testator intended
specific individuals to receive his property or whether he intended that
only those who were within the class of males would inherit.8 7  If
the court determines that the testator desired that certain individuals
receive his property, the gender description used in the will should
not alter this intent so as to divest the specified legatee of his share
of the estate. This, of course, assumes that the transsexual remains
the same "individual" that he was prior to his sexual reassignment.
On the other hand, if the court determines that the testator in-
tended that only those offspring who are contained within the class
of males receive his property, it must then ascertain at which time
that class became fixed. Since the testator made some distinction
between the sexes which he felt was determinative of the right to
receive his property, and since once sexually reassigned the individual
no longer possesses the attributes of his former sex,8" the intent of
the testator would be defeated if the male-to-female transsexual were
permitted to remain within the class favored by the testator. Thus, if
the class were fixed after the individual had been surgically reassigned,
the transsexual should not be treated as an heir. In the converse
situation, when a member of the disfavored sex is converted into
one of the sex which takes under the will, the same principles should
apply and the transsexual should receive a share of the estate.8 9 How-
87. See Coon v. McNelly, 254 Ill. 39, 98 N.E. 218 (1912). In this case, the
testator left his estate to "my grandchildren." The testator, however, had no grand-
children but his widow had twelve grandchildren from a prior marriage. The court
in this case admitted extrinsic evidence which indicated that the testator thought
of his stepchildren as being his own, stating that "for the purpose of determining
the object of the testator's bounty, a court may inquire into every material fact relat-
ing to the person who claims to be interested under the will, in order to identify
the person intended by the testator as a legatee." 98 N.E. at 219. See also Nicholl
v. Bergner, 76 Ohio App. 245, 63 N.E.2d 828 (1945), which summed up the rule
governing the admission of extrinsic evidence to resolve latent ambiguities in a will
stating:
Where there is a latent ambiguity as to an intended beneficiary, oral declarations
of a testatrix which have a bearing on the identity of the person intended are
admissible in evidence. The rule is concisely stated by Chief Justice Fuller in
Coulam v. Doull, 133 U.S. 216, 10 S. Ct. 253, 33 L. Ed. 596, in the following
terms: "2. Where a devise is, on the face of it, clear and intelligible, yet from
external circumstances an ambiguity arises as to which of two or more things
or persons the testator referred to, it being legally certain that he intended one
or the other, evidence of his declarations, of the instructions given for his will,
and of other circumstances of the like nature, is admissible to determine his
intention."
63 N.E.2d at 829.
88. See notes 23-34 supra and accompanying text.
89. It is, however, unlikely that the courts would allow a person to use the
"sex-change" operation solely to bring himself within the class favored in a will and
thus defeat the intent of the testator. See Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust
Co., 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967). In this case a man adopted his wife so that upon his
death she would receive the property destined to vest in his heirs. The court held that,
notwithstanding statutory language which expressly provided that an adopted child
be treated as a natural child for purposes of descent and distribution, a person would
not be allowed to act in a manner to prevent property from passing il accord with
the wishes of the testator. The court stated that "[a]doption of an adult for the
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ever, in interpreting any will, it must be remembered that the rules of
construction merely aid the court in reaching a decision. These rules
are not inflexible, and courts have been known to come to opposite
conclusions when faced with similar fact situations 0
There may be situations in which courts might choose not to
effectuate the intent of the testator. For example, if a bequest were
found to be conditioned on the heir's not undergoing a surgical sex
reassignment, the court would have to decide whether to ignore the
condition and convey the property to the converted transsexual. Gen-
erally, the law allows a person to attach any condition to the disposi-
tion of his property as long as that condition is not illegal or in
derogation of public policy.9 ' Thus, such a provision would be valid
unless a court determined that it was against public policy to discourage
a troubled transsexual from seeking medical help.
Courts will usually uphold conditions which would discourage
intemperate habits92 or encourage the development of positive character
traits. 3 Reasonable restraints of marriage have also been held valid.
For example, restraints against marrying specific persons94 or against
marrying persons belonging to a specific class95 have been upheld, as
have restrictions upon the time at which a person may marry.96 How-
purpose of bringing that person under the provision of a pre-existing testamentary
instrument when he clearly was not intended to be so covered should not be permitted
and we do not view this as doing any great violence to the intent and purpose of our
adoption laws." Id. at 344. Extrinsic evidence would probably be admissible to show
that a legatee had independent reasons for undergoing the surgical change procedure.
90. Compare Bedinger v. Graybill, 302 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Ky. 1957) with Minary
v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1967). In both
of these cases, the testatrix created a trust for her children. In Bedinger v. Graybill,
the testatrix created a trust for her son, which, upon his death, was to be distributed
"to the heirs at law of my son, Robert E. Graybill, according to the Law of Descent
and Distribution in force in Kentucky at the time of his death." After the testatrix
had died, her son adopted his wife so that, as his heir at law, she would receive the
trust estate. The court held, in a proceeding to determine to whom the property was
to be distributed, that by adopting his wife the testatrix' son made her his heir at law
for purposes of administration of the will. The situation in Minary v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank and Trust Co. was substantially identical to the one presented in Graybill. The
only difference was that in Minary the instrument stated that the trust was to "be
distributed to my then surviving heirs, according to the laws of descent and distribu-
tion then in force in Kentucky. . . ." (Emphasis in the original). In this case,
however, the court held that the adoption did not bring the wife within the class of
people the testatrix intended to benefit from her will. After pointing out that in
Graybill the term "heirs at law of Robert" was used while in this case the trust
was to be distributed to "my then surviving heirs," the court distinguished the fact
situations stating that the result was dependent upon the language used.
91. 5 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.3, at 401 (W. Bowe & D. Parker rev.
1962).
92. See, e.g., Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944) (provisions
requiring a person to refrain from consuming alcoholic beverages); Onderdonk v.
Onderdonk, 127 N.Y. 196, 27 N.E. 839 (1891) (prohibition on the consumption of
wines, spirits or tobacco).
93. See, e.g., Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886) (require-
ment that beneficiary learn a "useful trade, business, or profession") ; Campbell v.
Clough, 71 N.H. 181, 51 A. 668 (1901) (good habits).
94. Graydon v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229 (1872); Taylor v. Rapp, 217 Ga. 654,
124 S.E.2d 271 (1962).
95. Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955).
96. Wise v. Crandall, 215 S.W. 245 (Mo. 1919).
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ever, a general restraint upon marriage is not considered to be in
the public interest and will not be enforced." The same is true of
conditions which will induce separation or divorce of married couples.
However, although some courts invalidate gifts which attempt to
influence a person's religion, other courts hold that they do not violate
public policy.9
Although it is difficult to predict the attitude of courts toward
transsexual legatees, the tendency of the courts to invalidate testa-
mentary provisions is greater when those provisions might be expected
to affect society adversely. However, because society's interest in
encouraging persons to seek necessary medical treatment is as funda-
mental as its interest in marriage,' 00 and because transsexualism cannot
be dealt with except through surgical reassignment, 1' a court should
refuse to give force to a condition barring a sexually reassigned
individual from taking under a will.
Criminal Liability
The postoperative transsexual, in attempting to interact in today's
society, may be the subject of a variety of criminal sanctions. Existing
vagrancy statutes,0 2 which have been used to convict transvestites for
the act of cross-dressing,'0 3 have allegedly been enforced against trans-
sexuals despite the difference between them and female impersonators.
Furthermore, because of their ambiguous sexual status, it appears that
the transsexual's sexual activity may fall within the conduct proscribed
by perverted practices statutes0 which have been used to prohibit
homosexual acts.' Since violation of either set of statutes depends
97. In re Agnew's Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 1006, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1957).
98. In re Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 64 N.Y.S. 1029 (1900).
99. Compare Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 A. 907 (1922) with United
States Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P2d 860 (1954). See
also 5 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.28 (W. Bowe & D. Parker rev. 1962).
100. Cf. E.P. Marriage License, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 598 (1957). The court, in this
case, held that an epileptic should be permitted to marry notwithstanding the statutory
prohibition stating:
Since the family is the basic unit of society, limitation of the epileptic's right to
marry may constitute a formidable obstacle to his adjustment. Fear that legal
sanctions may be invoked against marriage increases the epileptic's tension. The
resulting maladjustment may add a substantial obstacle to the successful treat-
ment of the epileptic.
Id. at 605.
101. See p. 239 supra.
102. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 887 (1958) states:
The following persons are vagrants:
7. a person, who, having his face painted, discolored, covered or concealed,
or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his being identified,
appears in a road or public highway, or in a field, lot, wood or inclosure.
103. See, e.g., People v. Archibald, 58 Misc. 2d 862, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
See also SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 485 (1965) ; Washington Post,
May 14, 1971, § C, at 1, col. 1, in which a transsexual states that she has been arrested
several times for female impersonation.
104. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1971).
105. Fisher, supra note 77, at 92.
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upon the sexual identity of the accused, it becomes necessary for
society to determine the transsexual's legal sex.
Statutes which currently make female impersonation a crime were
originally enacted to prohibit people from disguising themselves so as
to prevent identification."0 6 Since the postoperative male transsexual
appears both physically and psychologically to belong to the female sex,
requiring him to wear masculine garments perpetuates the evil which
the statute was designed to prevent. Therefore, if society has any in-
terest in effectuating the principles underlying such enactments it should
insist that the transsexual wear clothes befitting his physical appearance
rather than those designed for members of the opposite gender.
The perverted practices statutes which have been used to prohibit
homosexual conduct are derived from the common law crime of bug-
gery."0 7 This crime initially referred only to anal intercourse or copu-
lation with animals ;108 however, modern interpretations have included
oral-genital contacts within statutory prohibitions.'0 9 Furthermore,
it is possible that the term "unnatural act" which is found in most
statutes might be construed so as to apply to transsexual relationships."
Although these laws are ripe for revision"' and subject to constitu-
tional attack,"' they must still be contended with in most states.
Nonetheless, since these statutes have never been intended to prohibit
normal sexual intercourse" 3 it would be an aberration of justice for
a person to be convicted for engaging in this act merely because of the
state of his chromosomes.
Since neither of these types of statutes were intended to proscribe
the transsexual's behavior and since enforcement of these prohibitions
against the transsexual is inconsistent with the statutory purpose it
is suggested that the threat of prosecution be eliminated by defining
the legal sex of the transsexual so that it conforms with his anatomical
appearance. Once the state adopts this conclusion, the transsexual will
be able to assume a normal life without fearing that his everyday
actions may be construed as criminal behavior.
106. See People v. Archibald, 58 Misc. 2d 862, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (1968)
(Markowitz, J., dissenting).
107. 25 Henry VIII, ch. 6 (1533).
108. People v. Smith, 117 Cal. App. 2d 698, 256 P.2d 586 (1953).
109. Lason v. State, 152 Fla. 440, 12 So. 2d 305 (1943).
110. Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 431, 120 N.E.2d 189 (1954). An un-
natural act has been defined to mean "irregular indulgence in sexual behavior, illicit
sexual relations, and infamous conduct which is lustful, obscene, and in deviation of
accepted customs and manners." 120 N.E.2d at 192. See also Blake v. State, 210 Md.
459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956), which indicated that the Maryland statute should not be
limited by its precise language but should be read broadly so as to effect its obvious
purpose.
111. See Fisher, supra note 77.
112. See In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). The issue presented in
this case was whether engaging in private homosexual activity with consenting adults
was the type of conduct which would allow the government to deny a petition for
naturalization. The court stated that private activity of this nature was harmless to
the community and that "any effort to regulate or penalize the conduct may lead to
an unjustified invasion of the individual's constitutional rights." Id. at 927.
113. States which desire to prohibit normal sexual intercourse between unmarried
people have enacted fornication statutes which expressly proscribe such behavior.
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1966).
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Society's Interest
In today's society, the transsexual is in a state of sexual limbo.
Physically and psychologically he appears to belong to one sex, while
legally he is classified as belonging to another. This ambiguity of
identity not only casts doubt upon the validity of the transsexual's
marriage and subjects him to the possibility of arrest whenever he
appears in public wearing the clothes of his choice, but also forces him
to face potential harassment and ridicule every time he must produce
official identification." 4 The transsexual is thus set apart as he attempts
to assume a productive role in society." 5 Although his behavior is
not in any way disruptive or destructive, the transsexual is subjected
to legal and emotional punishment because his psychological develop-
ment does not match his chromosomal makeup. Such action seems
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's eloquent formulation of the
right to privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." 6
In recognizing the importance of man's right to be let alone, some
courts have ordered the expungement of arrest records because of
the effect they may have on a person's future." 7 These decisions and
the statutes permitting changes in official records for certain reasons1 1
evidence a realization that the needs of society must be carefully
balanced against the rights of the individual, particularly when a
person's life might be impeded unnecessarily by matters relatively
unimportant to society at large.
Refusal to reclassify the sex of a postoperative transsexual seems
inconsistent with the principles of a society which expresses concern
for the privacy and dignity of its citizens. Failure to redefine sex in
114. Federal regulations provide that to secure a passport one must present a birth
certificate as proof of citizenship. 22 C.F.R. § 51.43 (1971). Furthermore, this docu-
ment is also required to prove eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.703 (1971).
115. Since a person must live his life in relation to various social systems, if his
behavior is different from the prevailing norms of society he may find himself
ostracized from traditional groupings. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy,
31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 307, 308 (1966).
116. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117. United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); accord, In re
Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1970). Contra, Herschel v. Dyra, 365
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966). Expungement may also be required by statute. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West 1971).
118. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
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the case of the transsexual will create undue hardship for an otherwise
troubled person." 9 Society will lose nothing and transsexuals will
gain the opportunity to lead "normal" lives if legal sex is determined
not by chromosomes or anatomy at birth alone, but by present
psychology and anatomy.
CONCLUSION
Today the transsexual is faced with the choice between two equally
undesirable alternatives. If he chooses to live within the sex to which
he was born he has, in effect, condemned himself to a perpetual
masquerade. If he decides to seek medical reassignment, he subjects
himself to the scorn and curiosity of society and the limbo of no legal
sex identity. Both situations are appalling and are inconsistent with
the professed enlightenment of our times.
Society should treat the transsexual as it would treat any other
person who is suffering from a medically curable defect or disease by
providing him with every procedure needed to help him achieve a
productive role in the social order.
To deny the individual the right to assume under the law the
identity granted him by surgery ignores a fundamental purpose of
our judicial system: to regulate the interactions among people. Judicial
fairness requires that society determine sex on the basis of psycho-
logical identity and anatomical appearance. Once this test is adopted,
society will cease to deprive the transsexual of his fundamental rights
and will enable him to undertake the peaceful pursuit of happiness.
119. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM
AND SEx REASSIGNMENT 37 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969).
The male transsexual is disgusted with the development of his primary and
secondary sexual characteristics to the point where he frequently contemplates
and occasionally performs self-mutilation of his genitalia. He prefers normal,
heterosexual men as sexual partners, and rejects homosexual men or the idea
that his sexual activity is homosexual. Feeling that he belongs to the female sex,
he considers it appropriate to have a love relationship with a man, and he feels
"unnatural" in a relationship with a woman, considering this "homosexual." There
is some evidence that overt sexual activity, whether it be considered homosexual
or heterosexual, plays a minor secondary role. The male transsexual may decide
to pass and become accepted as a female, either before or after sex-reassignment
surgery, depending upon individual circumstances. In most cases, he becomes
"she" to such a convincing degree that there is no question as to the individual's
femaleness. Once the transsexual becomes aware of the possibility of the change-
of-sex operation, he cannot rest until he obtains this cherished goal, and he
frequently becomes depressed and suicidal while trying to find medical help.
Id. at 58. See also Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321(1966).
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